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Twin Falls Co. Case No. 
CR-2013-1284 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' January 29, 2015 
unpublished opinion in which the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's 
order denying Cabrera's motion to suppress and vacated the judgment entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. State v. 
Cabrera, Docket No. 41510, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 329 (Idaho App., 
Jan. 29, 2015) (hereinafter "Opinion"). The Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court's order denying Cabrera's suppression motion based, in part, on its 
1 
determination that, pursuant to its prior opinion in State v. Brandstetter, 127 
Idaho 885, 908 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1995), where an individual has no "affirmative 
obligation to answer" questions posed by an officer during the course of an 
investigation, lying in response to the questions asked does not support probable 
cause for an arrest for resisting, delaying or obstructing an investigation as 
prohibited by I.C. § 18-705, even if the lies told delay or obstruct the officer's 
investigation. (Opinion, pp.6, 10-11.) Review is appropriate because the Court 
of Appeals opinion is contrary to the plain language of I.C. § 18-705 and is 
inconsistent with the probable cause standard for arrests and with precedent 
from this Court and the Court of Appeals. For the Court's convenience, a copy of 
the Court of Appeals' Opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings In District Court 
Deputy Travis DeBie responded to a request for assistance at a dairy in 
Twin Falls where Deputy DeBie was asked to make contact with Alejandro 
Gordobea1 and ask him to "stop sending threatening text message[s]." (Tr. 2 , p.7, 
Ls.3-16.) Upon arriving at the dairy, Deputy DeBie talked to two men and asked 
if they knew Gordobea and told them he needed to find Gordobea. (Tr., p.8, 
Ls.3-17.) After advising the men why he needed to speak to Gordobea, they 
1 At the suppression hearing, Deputy DeBrie referred to Alejandro Gordobea, 
which is the name used in Deputy DeBrie's Affidavit in Support of Complaint (R., 
pp.10-11,) as Alejandro Cordova. For consistency with the Appellant's Brief, the 
state will use Gordobea even though Deputy DeBrie used Cordova in his 
testimony. 
2 There are two transcripts included in the record on appeal. All transcript 
references in this brief are to the transcript containing the suppression hearing. 
2 
initially denied knowing him but then "said that they believed that he lived in the 
apartments on the dairy." (Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.2.) The two men were later 
identified as Gordobea and Cabrera. (Tr., p.9, Ls.3-7.) 
After he was unable to locate Gordobea at the apartments, Deputy DeBie 
spoke with the dairy foreman who told him Gordobea was in the barn and the 
foreman described one of the men that initially directed Deputy DeBie to the 
apartments. (Tr., p.10, Ls.922.) The foreman accompanied Deputy DeBie back 
to the barn. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-2.) The foreman saw Gordobea running away. (Tr., 
p.11, Ls.4-7.) Deputy DeBie saw Cabrera and told him he "needed to talk to 
him." (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-11.) Cabrera "started to run" and Deputy DeBie "shouted 
for him to stop and come talk to [him]." (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-13.) Cabrera stopped 
and came back to talk to the deputy and eventually admitted he was "good 
friends" with Gordobea and that they lied because they were afraid Gordobea 
"was in trouble and might be arrested." (Tr., p.11, Ls.14-25.) "After questioning," 
Deputy DeBrie arrested Cabrera for "obstructing and delaying a peace officer." 
(Tr., p.12, Ls.2-4.) A search incident to arrest revealed a clear glass pipe with 
methamphetamine residue. (Tr., p.12, Ls.5-16.) 
The state charged Cabrera with possession of methamphetamine. (R., 
pp.8-9, 40-41.) Cabrera filed a motion to suppress, claiming his arrest was 
unlawful and, therefore, the methamphetamine discovered during the search 
incident to his arrest must be suppressed. (R., pp.55-56.) The district court 
denied the motion after which Cabrera entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
charged offense, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression 
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motion. (R., pp.88, 127-128, 131-141.) The court imposed a unified six-year 
sentence with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Cabrera 
on probation. (R., pp.182-188.) Cabrera filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., 
pp.211-214.) 
Course Of Proceedings On Appeal 
On appeal, Cabrera challenged the denial of his motion to suppress, 
arguing his arrest was invalid because his statements did not obstruct Deputy 
DeBie's investigation. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Cabrera proffered two reasons his 
statement did not constitute obstruction. (Id.) "First," Cabrera asserted, "when a 
false statement has no more effect on the investigation than remaining silent, the 
false statement does not constitute 'obstruction."' (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
"Second," Cabrera claimed, "a false statement does not constitute a false report, 
such that it would be 'obstructing' under the statute, if the encounter was initiated 
by the officer." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Cabrera relied on the Brandstetter 
opinion in support of his claim on appeal. 
Brandstetter was an attorney who represented a defendant "charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver." Brandstetter, 127 
Idaho at 886, 908 P .2d at 579. Law enforcement also believed Brandstetter's 
client was involved in money laundering and they ultimately obtained a search 
warrant for Brandstetter's office to search for the defendant's safe, which they 
believed had been delivered to Brandstetter's firm. ~ When police interviewed 
Brandstetter regarding the location of the safe, "Brandstetter claimed that the 
safe was never present in the law offices" and said, if anyone reported that the 
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defendant's safe was there, that was "bullshit." kl After the safe was discovered 
in the alley next to Brandstetter's office, police arrested Brandstetter for resisting 
and obstructing based on Brandstetter "making a false statement." kl, 127 Idaho 
at 886-887 and n.3, 908 P.2d at 579-580 and n.3. "Thus, the question on appeal 
[was] whether under the particular facts of th[e] case the nonthreatening false 
statement, not made under oath, falls within the purview of the § 18-705 
prohibition against obstructing an officer." Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 888, 908 P.2d 
at 581. Answering this question, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Here, we believe it is doubtful that Brandstetter can be said 
to have hampered police officials in the exercise of their duties by 
falsely responding to a question which he was not legally obligated 
to answer. His deliberate falsification was no more obstructive than 
would have been his silence. Because Brandstetter could have 
remained silent when questioned by the law enforcement officials, 
his unsworn oral misstatement cannot be said to have increased 
the officers' burden, on the facts presented here. We, therefore, 
find that Brandstetter's making of an unsworn false oral statement 
to the police was not an obstruction of an officer within the meaning 
of I.C. § 18-705. 
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888, 908 P.2d at 581. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with Cabrera that his "false statement that 
he did not know Gordobea/ which resulted in the deputy having "to continue to 
search[] for Gordobea on the dairy farm," was "[s]imilar to the false statement in 
Brandstetter" and that "[l]ike Brandstetter, Cabrera had no affirmative obligation 
to answer the deputy's questions, and thus he did not increase the deputy's 
burden." (Opinion, p.6.) The Court of Appeals, still relying on Brandstetter, 
further stated: 
While it is true that had Cabrera told the truth, the deputy would not 
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have had to continue looking for Gordobea; Cabrera had no 
obligation to short-circuit the deputy's time and effort. See 
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888, 908 P.2d at 581. We can 
determine no basis to distinguish this case from Brandstetter. 
Therefore, because Cabrera's statement was no more obstructing 
than his silence would have been, his arrest was unlawful, and the 
warrantless search incident to his arrest was unreasonable." 
(Opinion, p.6 (footnote omitted).) 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the state's contention that Cabrera 
misdirected Deputy DeBie by suggesting that Deputy DeBie look for Gordobea in 
the apartments. (Opinion, p.5.) In doing so, the Court of Appeals found Cabrera 
"simply told the officer where Gordobea lives," thereby rejecting any 
interpretation of Cabrera's statement as evidencing an intent to direct Deputy 
DeBie away from Gordobea who was standing right next to Cabrera when the 
statement was made - an intent that was consistent with Gordobea fleeing from 
the barn when Deputy DeBie returned after looking for Gordobea at the 
apartments and learning from the dairy foreman that Gordobea was actually the 
man who was with Cabrera when Deputy DeBie spoke to them in the barn. 
Based on its analysis, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's 
suppression order and vacated Cabrera's judgment of conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance. (Opinion, p.6.) The state filed a timely petition for 
review. 
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ISSUE ON REVIEW 
Is review appropriate so that this Court can decide whether misdirecting a 
law enforcement officer by lying in response to the officer's questions provides 
probable cause to arrest for a violation of I.C. § 18-705, which prohibits resisting, 
obstructing, or delaying an officer who is performing a lawful duty? 
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ARGUMENT 
Review Is Appropriate Because The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Is Contrary 
To The Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-705 And Is Inconsistent With The 
Probable Cause Standard For Arrests And With Prior Precedents Of This 
Court And The Court Of Appeals 
A Introduction 
The Court of Appeals, relying on its prior opinion in Brandstetter, supra, 
held that Cabrera's conduct did not constitute obstruction because, even though 
a truthful response would have prevented fruitless investigation, "Cabrera had no 
obligation to short-circuit the deputy's time and effort." (Opinion, p.6.) Review is 
appropriate because the Court of Appeals' decision is contrary to I.C. § 18-705, 
the probable cause standard, and prior precedent. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting of review is discretionary. I.AR. 118(b). Factors considered by 
the Court in deciding whether to grant review include "[w]hether the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with 
applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court," I.AR. 118(b)(2), and 
"[w]hether the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
previous decision of the Court of Appeals," I.AR. 118(b)(3). In reviewing an 
Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, "this Court gives serious consideration to the 
views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower 
court." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
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decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
C. Deputy DeBie Had Probable Cause To Arrest Cabrera For A Violation Of 
I.C. § 18-705 Based On Cabrera's Intentional Misdirection Of Deputy 
DeBie's Investigation 
In order to validly arrest Cabrera, Deputy DeBie had to have probable 
cause to believe Cabrera resisted and obstructed in violation of I.C. § 18-705. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 816, 203 P.3d at 1215. The elements of resisting and 
obstructing are: "(1) the person who was resisted, delayed or obstructed was a 
law enforcement officer; (2) the defendant knew that the person was an officer; 
and (3) the defendant also knew at the time of the resistance that the officer was 
attempting to perform some official act or duty." & Cabrera does not dispute 
that Deputy DeBie was performing an official act or duty or that he knew Deputy 
DeBie was a law enforcement officer. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) Instead, Cabrera 
contends his arrest was unlawful because, based on the limitations articulated in 
Brandstetter, his conduct did not constitute resisting, delaying or obstructing 
since he "could have stood silent" and Deputy DeBie "would have still taken the 
same track ... and continued to look around the dairy for Mr. Gordobea." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) This Court should reject this judicial narrowing of I.C. 
§ 18-705, at least as it pertains to the question of whether probable cause exists 
for an arrest. 
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the 
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statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
the statute must be construed as a whole."' Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. 
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). '"If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written."' 
As noted, the challenged element in this case is whether Cabrera resisted, 
delayed or obstructed Deputy DeBie. Cabrera's act of directing Deputy DeBie 
away from the individual the deputy was looking for - Gordobea - unquestionably 
delayed and obstructed Deputy DeBie in pursuit of his lawful duty, thereby 
"increas[ing]" Deputy DeBie's "burden." Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888, 908 P.2d 
at 581. Idaho Code § 18-705 does not make an exception for circumstances in 
which an individual "could have stood silent" and chose to lie instead. All the 
statute requires is that the defendant "willfully resist[ed], delay[ed] or obstruct[ed] 
any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge ... any duty of his 
office." I.C. § 18-705. That Cordoba "could have stood silent" has no bearing on 
whether his actual conduct obstructed or delayed Deputy DeBie, much less any 
bearing on whether the deputy had probable cause to arrest Cordoba for 
resisting, obstructing, or delaying.3 "For an arrest to be considered lawful, it must 
be based on probable cause" to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) (citations 
3 The state also notes that even if Cabrera did not succeed in delaying or 
obstructing Deputy DeBie, he certainly attempted to do so, I.C. § 18-306, and 
thus there was probable cause to arrest even accepting the Court of Appeals' 
analysis. 
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omitted). "Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the 
officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been or is being 
committed." kt (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). As such, Deputy 
DeBie had probable cause to arrest Cabrera. This result is consistent with prior 
cases. 
For example, this Court, in State v. George, 127 Idaho 693, 905 P .2d 626 
(1995), explained: 
... [A]ccording to the Idaho State Police officer's affidavit of 
probable cause, he initially stopped George for driving her vehicle 
at a speed of 66 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. At that 
point, he could lawfully request George's driver's license, 
registration and proof of insurance that he could identify the person 
with whom he was dealing. This was necessary for his protection 
and so that he could accurately prepare the reports required for this 
incident. The fact that George would not cooperate with the officer 
constitute delaying and obstructing an officer in carrying out one of 
the duties of his office pursuant to I. C. § 18-705. 
Even more on point is the Court of Appeals' prior opinion in State v. 
Quimby, 122 Idaho 389, 834 P.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1992). In Quimby, the Court of 
Appeals considered "whether there was probable cause to place Quimby under 
arrest for obstructing a police officer." kt, 122 Idaho at 391, 834 P.2d at 908. 
The Court of Appeals concluded there was, stating: 
In the present case, there is no question that the officers had 
probable cause to arrest Quimby for obstructing their attempt to 
arrest his brother. Though Quimby did not touch the officers, he 
placed himself in the path of the officers, forcing them to push him 
out of the way. Quimby ignored the officers' repeated verbal 
requests to move away. He placed himself unnecessarily close to 
the officers and made hand gestures in front of their faces. These 
facts are sufficient to establish probable cause for Quimby's arrest. 
kt; see also State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 363, 63 P.3d 485, 489 (Ct. App. 
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2003) (sufficient evidence of obstructing where defendant fled on his bike after 
officers said they wanted to speak to him, defendant then hid in closet and 
refused to come out of hiding spot); State v. Wight, 117 Idaho 604, 607, 790 P.2d 
385, 388 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Wight's reaction in pushing the officer constituted 
sufficient grounds to arrest him for obstructing and delaying."). 
Even assuming the Court of Appeals was correct when it concluded that 
Cabrera could have chosen to remain silent, that is not the question. The 
relevant question under I.C. § 18-705 is whether by his actions, which did not 
include remaining silent, there was probable cause for Deputy Debie to arrest 
him for obstructing and delaying the deputy's lawful duties. The answer to that 
question is yes. 
Finally, with respect to the Court of Appeals' statement that the record 
does not support the state's argument that Cabrera "expressly misdirected the 
officer away from the individual he was looking for and suggested he go look for 
Gordobea in apartments located on the dairy," the state disagrees. (Opinion, 
p.5.) While Cabrera did not specifically tell Deputy DeBie to go search for 
Gordobea in the apartments, it is not a misrepresentation of the record to 
interpret Cabrera's comments about Gordobea's potential location as evidencing 
an intent to willfully misdirect the deputy in order to obstruct or delay him in his 
ability to locate Gordobea who was with Cabrera when the statements were 
made. At a minimum, Cabrera's comments in this regard were sufficient for 
purposes of finding probable cause for his arrest pursuant to I.C. § 18-705. 
Cabrera's arrest was lawful and, as a result, so was the search incident to 
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his arrest. Accordingly, this Court should grant review and conclude that Cabrera 
has failed to meet his burden of showing any error in the denial of his 
suppression motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court grant review and, on review, 
affirm the judgment of the district court entered upon Cabrera's conditional guilty 
plea to possession of methamphetamine. 
DATED this 31 st day of March 2015. 
JE¥s1qA M. LORELLO 
DeP,0y Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31 st day of March, 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW by causing a copy addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 
Falls County. Hon. G. Richard Bevan, District Judge. 
Order denying defendant's motion to suppress, reversed; judgment of conviction 
and sentence for possession of a controlled substance, vacated. 
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy 
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
GRATTON, Judge 
Alfredo Cabrera appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. 
He asserts that his arrest for obstructing a peace officer was unlawful because the statement upon 
which his arrest was premised did not actually constitute obstruction under the statute. We 
reverse. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A patrol deputy for the Twin Falls County Sheriffs Office was asked to make contact 
with Alejandro Gordobea to request that he cease sending threatening text messages to a third 
party. Upon arriving at the dairy where Gordobea was reported to work, the deputy encountered 
two men, told them why he was there, and asked if either of them knew Gordobea. Both men 
denied knowing Gordobea and, after further questioning, stated that they believed he lived in the 
apartments on the dairy. 
After the deputy was unable to locate Gordobea in the apartments, he spoke with the 
dairy foreperson, who told him that Gordobea should be working in the milk barn and described 
Gordobea, which matched one of the men with whom the deputy initially made contact. The 
deputy returned to the milk barn with the foreperson, and the foreperson saw Gordobea running 
away from the milk barn. However, Cabrera was still there, although he, too, was leaving the 
milk barn. After initially attempting to evade contact with the deputy, Cabrera spoke with the 
deputy and admitted that he was good friends with Gordobea. Cabrera later admitted that both 
he and Gordobea lived in the apartments on the dairy, and that they lied because they were afraid 
Gordobea was in trouble and might be arrested. The deputy then arrested Cabrera for obstructing 
a peace officer. Upon searching Cabrera incident to his arrest, the deputy found a clear glass 
pipe with methamphetamine residue in Cabrera's jacket pocket. 
The State charged Cabrera with possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and resisting and obstructing an officer. 1 Cabrera filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence found during the search, arguing that the arrest was unlawful. After conducting an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion finding that Cabrera's false statement to 
the deputy constituted obstruction under Idaho Code § 18-705; therefore, his arrest and 
subsequent search were lawful. 2 Cabrera entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court imposed a unified six-year 
sentence, with two years determinate, but suspended the sentence and placed Cabrera on 
probation. Cabrera timely appeals. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
The State subsequently dismissed the charges for possession of paraphernalia and 
resisting and obstructing an officer. 
2 The district court rejected the State's alternative argument--that I.C. § 18-5413(2), which 
criminalizes knowingly giving false information to an officer who is investigating the 
commission of a crime, justified Cabrera's arrest--because the district court determined that the 
deputy was not investigating an offense when Cabrera made his false statement. The State does 
not contest this determination. 
2 
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless 
search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within an exception to the warrant 
requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999). A search incident to a lawful arrest 
constitutes one such exception. Riley v. California,_ U.S. __ , __ , 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 
(2014); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,235 (1973); State v. Moore, 129 Idaho 
776, 78 l, 932 P.2d 899, 904 (Ct. App. 1996). Searches incident to arrest are allowed because the 
arresting officer needs to remove any weapons that the arrestee may have, and search for and 
seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 
State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 81, 813 P.2d 888,892 (1991). 
Cabrera contends that his arrest for obstructing a peace officer and subsequent search was 
unlawful because the statement upon which his arrest was premised did not fall within the 
purview of the I.C. § l 8-705 prohibition against obstructing an officer. Idaho Code § 18-705 
provides: 
Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer, in the 
discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office or who knowingly 
gives a false report to any peace officer, when no other punishment is prescribed, 
is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year. 
Thus, the statute prohibits conduct that resists, delays, or obstructs an officer, as well as giving a 
false report to a peace officer. 
Three elements must be satisfied in order to find a violation of the statute: "(1) the 
person who was resisted, delayed or obstructed was a law enforcement officer; (2) the defendant 
knew that the person was an officer; and (3) the defendant also knew at the time of the resistance 
that the officer was attempting to perform some official act or duty." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 
804, 816, 203 PJd 1203, 1215 (2009); State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624, 629, 67 P.3d 103, 108 
(Ct. App. 2003). Here, there is no dispute that the deputy was a law enforcement officer and that 
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Cabrera was aware of this fact or that the deputy was attempting to perform some official act or 
duty. Rather, Cabrera contends that his statement did not obstruct the officer as required by the 
first element. Cabrera asserts two different bases in support of his argument. 
First, Cabrera asserts that his false statement does not constitute a false report to establish 
criminal liability under the statute. In support of his argument, Cabrera points to State v. 
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885, 908 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1995). In that case, officers executed a 
search warrant on Brandstetter's law firm to locate a safe potentially related to a money 
laundering investigation. During that search, the officers asked Brandstetter about the safe and 
its location; in response, Brandstetter denied knowledge of the safe and its location. The officers 
ultimately discovered the safe in an alley behind the law firm, and Brandstetter was charged with 
obstructing an officer based on his false statements to the officers. The district court determined 
that a false report in the context of LC. § 18-705 required affirmative action in approaching law 
enforcement for the specific purpose of having some action taken, as opposed to answering 
questions posed by an officer. Therefore, the district court ruled that Brandstetter could not be 
guilty of giving a false report, even though he made a false statement to the officers, because his 
statement was made in response to police questioning. In construing the indictment as alleging a 
false responsive statement that resulted in obstruction, the district court dismissed the indictment 
against Brandstetter, finding no obstruction. 3 On appeal, the State did not challenge the district 
court's reasoning. Thus, rather than determining whether Brandstetter's false statement 
constituted a false report, the issue before this Court was whether his false statement, not made 
under oath, constituted obstruction under I.C. § 18-705. In the present case, the State does not 
claim Cabrera made a false report under the statute. 
Accordingly, Cabrera also asserts that his false statement was no more obstructive than 
would have been his silence, and thus, his false statement does not amount to obstruction within 
the statute. In Brandstetter, this Court engaged in a factual analysis to determine if 
Brandstetter's false statement increased the officers' burden, ultimately concluding that "because 
Brandstetter could have remained silent when questioned by law enforcement officials, his 
unswom oral misstatement cannot be said to have increased the officers' burden." Brandstetter, 
3 The charging language of the indictment alleged that Brandstetter made a false statement, 
but did not allege that he made a false report. Here, there is no charging document in the record 
against Cabrera for obstructing a peace officer. 
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127 Idaho at 888, 908 P.2d at 581. The Brandstetter Court did not go into factual detail as to 
what might increase an officer's burden, but simply held that where a false statement is no more 
obstructive than remaining silent would have been; there is no increase in the officers' burden. 
Thus, regardless of whether Brandstetter remained silent or gave a false statement, the officers 
would have had to execute the search warrant to locate the safe. It could be argued that had he 
answered truthfully, the officers would not have had to conduct the search; however, the 
Brandstetter Court did not go that far in its holding, but rather determined there to be no increase 
in the officers' burden based on the facts presented. Accordingly, Brandstetter's unswom false 
statement to the police was not obstruction within the meaning of I.C. § 18-705. 
In response to Cabrera's argument that Brandstetter dictates the result in this case, the 
State argues that statements that affirmatively misdirect law enforcement in performing their 
duties could be obstructive. The State argues that "Cabrera did not simply deny knowing 
Gordobea or his location. Instead, he expressly misdirected the officer away from the individual 
he was looking for and suggested he go look for Gordobea in apartments located on the dairy." 
The State's argument is not supported by the record. At the suppression hearing, the deputy 
testified: 
I asked them if they knew an Alejandro [Gordobea] who was working at the 
dairy, because I needed to talk to him. . . . At first they both stated that they did 
not. And then after a little bit more questioning, they said that they believed that 
he lived in the apartments on the dairy. 
The deputy later testified: 
Well, at first they both stated that they didn't know [Gordobea]; and then, like I 
said, after asking them again, they said that they believed he lived--Mr. Cabrera 
said that he believes that he lives in the apartments on the dairy. . . . I talked to 
him for a short period and then went to those apartments to see if I could locate 
[Gordobea]. 
The deputy's testimony does not support the State's assertion that Cabrera "suggested he go look 
for Gordobea in apartments located on the dairy," but reveals that Cabrera simply told the officer 
where Gordobea lives. There is no context in the record as to how Cabrera's statement was 
elicited other than his statement was in response to "a little bit more questioning." 
Further, to the extent that Cabrera's statement that Gordobea lived in the apartments on 
the dairy provided the basis for his arrest, there was no falsity. Because the deputy arrested 
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Cabrera for obstructing a peace officer on the basis that Cabrera lied to him, Cabrera's truthful 
statement as to Gordobea's residence cannot form the basis for his arrest.4 Therefore, there is no 
factual support for the State's assertion that Cabrera affirmatively misdirected the deputy. 
Similar to the false statement in Brandstetter, based on Cabrera's false statement that he 
did not know Gordobea, the deputy had to continue searching for Gordobea on the dairy farm. 
The deputy would have continued his search had Cabrera remained silent. Like Brandstetter, 
Cabrera had no affirmative obligation to answer the deputy's questions, and thus he did not 
increase the deputy's burden. While it is true that had Cabrera told the truth, the deputy would 
not have had to continue looking for Gordobea; Cabrera had no obligation to short-circuit the 
deputy's time and effort. See Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888, 908 P.2d at 581. We can 
determine no basis to distinguish this case from Brandstetter. 5 Therefore, because Cabrera's 
statement was no more obstructing than his silence would have been, his arrest was unlawful, 
and the warrantless search incident to his arrest was unreasonable. The district court erred in 
denying Cabrera's motion to suppress. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the district court's order denying Cabrera's motion to suppress. Accordingly, 
the district court's judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance is vacated. 
Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR. 
4 We express no opinion as to whether, under different circumstances, a true statement 
could fall within the purview of the LC. § 18-705 prohibition against obstructing an officer. 
5 The district court distinguished Brandstetter on the ground that Brandstetter was a target 
of an investigation and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment, whereas Cabrera was not. The 
State does not argue in support of that determination and we see no such distinction. 
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